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1. Introduction 
Differences in ownership and governance are arguably the most important factor 
differentiating venture capital (VC) investors, and these differences influence their objectives 
and their investment strategies (Da Rin et al. 2013). Different configurations of ownership 
and governance give rise to different types of VC investors. The most familiar VC investor 
type is the independent VC (IVC), an investor acting as general partner in a limited 
partnership in which the fund providers serve as limited partners (Sahlman, 1990). Non-
independent, or captive, VC investors are structured as investment vehicles or as business 
units of a parent company. The parent company is a non-financial company in the case of a 
corporate VC (CVC) investor, a financial intermediary in the case of a bank-affiliated VC 
(BVC) investor, and a governmental agency or body in the case of a governmental VC (GVC) 
investor. The parent company of a captive VC investor provides capital and has substantial 
influence on the selection and management of investments (Gompers, 2002; Leleux & 
Surlemont, 2003; Hellmann et al. 2008; Dimov & Gedajlovic, 2010; Dushnitsky, 2012).  
Most of the empirical evidence regarding how different types of VC investors operate 
is based on US data. This circumstance is particularly unfortunate because captive investors 
are more common, and thus easier to observe, outside of the US (Da Rin et al., 2013). The 
few studies conducted outside of the US typically focus on a single country and one specific 
dimension of the issue, which limits the extent to which their results can be used to obtain a 
systematic view of the patterns of VC investment outside of the US.  
In this stream of the literature, the work by Mayer et al. (2005) is an exception. These 
authors study the investment patterns of VC investors in relation to their source of financing 
in Germany, Israel, Japan and the United Kingdom. They examine the investment decisions of 
different VC investor types as related to the stage, industry and location of the target company 
and find substantial differences in the ways in which the various types of VC investors 
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operate in different countries. Contrary to their expectations, the differences that they find in 
these investment patterns do not follow the conventional distinction between bank- and 
market-based financial systems. The greatest similarities are found in the investment patterns 
of VC investors in the two European countries in their study (Germany and the United 
Kingdom). The results reported by Mayer et al. (2005) suggest that there might be a European 
pattern of VC investment, the description of which is beyond the aim of their paper. 
Moreover, the papers on VC in Europe (e.g., Lehmann, 2006; Cumming and Johan, 2007; 
Bottazzi et al., 2008; Schwienbacher, 2008; Schwienbacher et al., 2009; Alperovich and 
Hübner, 2013; Bertoni et al., 2013; Devigne et al., 2013; Croce et al., 2013; Luukkonen et al., 
2013; Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015) have focused more on value creation by different types of 
VC investors than on their investment patterns.  
As a result, the literature still lacks systematic evidence of the investment patterns of 
different types of VC investors in Europe. In this study, we contribute to filling this gap by 
examining the patterns of VC investment across different types of VC investors in Europe and 
comparing them to the investment patterns observed in the US. More specifically, we analyze 
the investment patterns of four VC investor types (IVC, CVC, BVC and GVC) with respect to 
the following investee company characteristics: industry, age, size, stage of development, 
distance from the investor and country (i.e., domestic or cross-border). We also investigate 
how the investment patterns of different VC investor types vary over time and across different 
European countries. In addition, we compare these investment patterns with those exhibited 
by the same four types of VC investors in the US (relating to industry and age of the investee 
company). This analysis allows us to assess whether different VC investor types have a 
distinct investment pattern in Europe compared to the US, which could contribute to 
explaining some of the differences in the VC market in the two continents.  
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In our analysis, we rely on relative specialization indices (Balassa, 1965), which are 
popular in the international trade and innovation literature (see Section 3). To the best of our 
knowledge, these indices have never been used in the entrepreneurial finance literature. By 
using these indices we can determine, within an investment dimension (e.g., industry), the 
relative propensity of a focal investor type (e.g., IVC) to invest in a particular category of 
investee company (e.g., ICT manufacturing) in comparison to all investors. Relative 
specialization indices also allow investment patterns to be compared over time and across 
different countries.  
In this study, we utilize the VICO database, a comprehensive dataset on the 
investments of different types of VC investors in young high-tech companies located in 
Europe. The primary advantage of using the VICO database for this study is that it overcomes 
the well-known deficiencies of commercial databases as regards the coverage of VC outside 
the US, including overrepresentation of IVC investments and mischaracterization of captive 
investors (see Section 4 for details). We obtain information from the VICO database on 1,663 
first VC investments made between 1994 and 2004 by 846 VC investors into 737 
entrepreneurial companies located in seven European countries (i.e., Belgium, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) that were less than 10 years old by 
the time of the first VC investment and that were operating in high-tech manufacturing and 
service industries.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We summarize the key 
characteristics of the European VC market in section 2. In section 3, we describe the 
methodology used to examine the investment patterns of the different VC investor types. In 
section 4, we present the dataset. Section 5 illustrates the empirical results. Section 6 is 
devoted to a discussion of our results in light of the extant literature. Finally, Section 7 
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highlights the contribution of this paper to the VC literature, its policy implications and some 
possible avenues for future research.  
2. The European Venture Capital Market 
Europe is one of the regions in the world in which VC is most developed. Of the 20 
developed countries with the highest VC investment relative to GDP, 13 are located in Europe 
(OECD, 2013). There is, however, a significant difference in the development of VC between 
Europe and the US. The VC investment to GDP ratio1 is more than four times higher in the 
US (0.17%) than in the United Kingdom (0.04%) and more than 10 times higher than in Spain 
or Italy (approx. 0.01%) (OECD, 2013).  
Differences in the legal and economic framework may explain some of the disparity in 
the development of VC between Europe and the US (Bruton et al., 2005). Venture capital 
requires a business-friendly legal environment (Armour and Cumming, 2006). Despite the 
significant regulatory efforts made by European countries to improve their attractiveness to 
VC, Europe still has not closed the historical gap with the US in terms of factors such as the 
level of shareholder protection, the effectiveness of corporate governance, bankruptcy law, 
and labor market rigidities (Bertoni and Croce, 2011). In addition to regulation, VC is 
extremely sensitive to the development of capital markets (Black and Gilson, 1998; Jeng and 
Wells, 2000). Higher volumes of IPOs and M&As accelerate and improve exits for VC 
investors (Giot and Schwienbacher, 2007; Bertoni and Groh, 2014). However, capital markets 
in continental Europe are historically bank-based rather than market-based (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Levine, 1999), and this factor has reportedly hampered the development of liquid capital 
markets. In sum, according to the latest VC & PE Country Attractiveness Index 
                                                 
1 The use of VC investments to GDP to gauge VC market development is discussed by Cumming (2011). 
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(Liechtenstein et al. 2014), Western Europe (with an index of 81.0) is substantially behind 
North America (98.3).  
Finally, the structure of the VC market appears to be different in the US and Europe. 
Since the 1990s, captive investors have accounted for a larger share of the VC market in 
Europe than in the US (Bottazzi and Da Rin, 2002). This difference may have increased even 
further in recent years with the substantial growth of government funding. The latest statistics 
from the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) show that approximately 40% of all 
funds raised by VC investors in Europe in 2013 came from governments; moreover, since 
2009, taxpayer money has systematically been the single largest source of VC funds on the 
continent (EVCA, 2014).  
3. Methodology 
We employ relative specialization indices to examine the investment patterns of the different 
types of VC investors in Europe. Relative specialization indices were originally used to 
compare trade flows and to evaluate the revealed comparative advantages of different 
countries. The idea behind the use of relative specialization indices is that if a country’s share 
of world exports of a particular good is greater than that country’s overall share of world 
exports, then the country has revealed its comparative advantage in exporting this good 
(Balassa, 1965). Due to their easy construction and interpretability, relative specialization 
indices have attracted substantial interest beyond the trade literature, including innovation 
scholars who have used them to examine countries’ and firms’ specialization in various 
technological fields (see the revealed technological advantage literature, e.g., Soete and Sally, 
1983; Cantwell, 1989; Pavitt, 1988; Archibugi and Pianta, 1992).  
The unit of analysis of this study is the VC investor type. Accordingly, we compute 
the relative specialization indices at the VC investor type level and use them to compare the 
patterns of investment of different VC types. Investment patterns are defined along six 
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dimensions that characterize investee companies: the (1) industry, (2) age, (3) stage and (4) 
size of the investee company at the time of the investment; (5) the geographical distance 
between the investee company and the VC investor; and (6) whether the investment is 
domestic or cross-border. For each dimension, we define a list of mutually exclusive 
categories (e.g., for the industry dimension, the categories are different industries and for the 
age dimension, the categories are different age classes).  
The most widely used family of specialization indices is derived from a measure that 
was initially proposed by Balassa (1965). We indicate by 𝑁𝑗,𝑘
𝑖  the number of investments by 
investor i=1,…4 that belong to category k=1,…,Mj of dimension j=1,…6.2 The Balassa Index 
(BI) is defined as follows: 
𝐵𝐼𝑗,𝑘
𝑖 =
𝑁𝑗,𝑘
𝑖
∑ 𝑁𝑗,𝑘
𝑖
𝑀𝑗
𝑘=1
(
∑ 𝑁𝑗,𝑘
𝑖4
𝑖=1
∑ ∑ 𝑁𝑗,𝑘
𝑖
𝑀𝑗
𝑘=1
4
𝑖=1
)
−1
       (1) 
The first term on the right hand side of Equation (1) measures the share of the investments 
made by investor type i in category k of dimension j over the total number of investments 
made by investor type i. The second term is the inverse of the share of the investments made 
by all VC investors in category k of dimension j over the total number of VC investments. For 
example, 𝐵𝐼1,1
1 , the specialization of VC investor type i=1 (the IVC) for category k=1 (ICT 
manufacturing) of dimension j=1 (the industry), is computed as the share of IVC investments 
in ICT manufacturing divided by the share of investments in ICT manufacturing made by all 
VC investors.3 
                                                 
2 The value of Mj for the 6 dimensions is as follows: M1=6 (industry), M2=4 (age), M3=4 (size), M4=4 (distance), 
M5=3 (stage), M6=2 (country). Thus we have a total of 23 distinct categories for the 6 dimensions. 
3 In our sample, the number of IVC investments in ICT manufacturing (𝑁1,1
1 ) is 163; the total number of IVC 
investments (∑ 𝑁𝑗,𝑘
1𝑀𝑗
𝑘=1 ) is 918; the number of VC investments in ICT manufacturing (∑ 𝑁1,1
𝑖4
𝑖=1 ) is 284 and the 
total number of VC investments (∑ ∑ 𝑁𝑗,𝑘
𝑖𝑀𝑗
𝑘=1
4
𝑖=1 ) is 1,663. 𝐵𝐼1,1
1  is therefore equal to  163/918/(284/1,663)= 
1.040. 
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The Balassa index is easy to compute and has an intuitive interpretation, but its use in 
empirical analysis has some shortcomings (Dalum et al., 1998). In our study, a major problem 
with the Balassa index arises due to the uneven number of investments made by different VC 
investor types. The problem arises because sampling and measurement errors have a larger 
impact on categories for which the number of observations is small.4 The Balassa index also 
tends to have an asymmetric and skewed distribution (Grupp, 1994). To alleviate these 
problems, we follow Dalum et al. (1998) and transform the Balassa index as follows:  
𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑗,𝑘
𝑖 =
𝐵𝐼𝑗,𝑘
𝑖 −1
𝐵𝐼𝑗,𝑘
𝑖 +1
         (2) 
The transformed Balassa index (TBI) ranges from −1 to +1, and 0 is its neutral value. Positive 
(negative) values of TBI indicate that investor type i is more (less) specialized in category k of 
dimension j than other investor types. The TBI computed in Equation (2) exhibits two 
primary advantages over the untransformed Balassa index. First, it attributes the same weight 
to changes below the neutral value as it does to changes above the neutral value. Second, 
TBIs are asymptotically normal under a more general set of assumptions than the Balassa 
index itself (Dalum et al., 1998; Schubert and Grupp, 2011). We can then use the 
asymptotically normal distribution of the TBI to test the null hypothesis that for a given VC 
investor type in a given category of a given dimension, the value of the relevant TBI is equal 
to 0. To compute these t-tests for the null hypothesis that TBI=0 we use the procedure 
described by Schubert and Grupp (2011).5  
                                                 
4 For instance, in our sample, the number of IVC investments is larger than the number of CVC investments by a 
factor of 5.6 (918 vs. 165), which means that the same measurement error would have an impact on CVC’s BI 
that is larger by a factor of 5.6 than its impact on IVC’s BI. 
5 In our data, the TBI correlates with the original BI at 95.69%. The transformation that we adopt to compute 
TBI is common in the literature, but other transformations are also possible. For example, the Balassa index can 
be subjected to a logarithmic transformation (Vollrath, 1991) or a hyperbolic tangent transformation (Grupp, 
1994). We replicated our analyses using these alternative transformation methods. The TBI that was used here 
correlates with both Grupp’s (1994) and Vollrath’s (1991) specifications at a 99% level and the results we 
obtained are virtually the same. For the sake of synthesis, we do not report the results obtained under these 
different transformations, which are available upon request. 
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4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample of VC investments is extracted from the VICO database. This database is part of a 
project financed by the 7th Framework Programme promoted by the European Commission 
(see www.vicoproject.org), and it has been used by several recent works (e.g., Croce et al., 
2013; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014; Cumming et al., 2014; Colombo et al., 2014a; Grilli and 
Murtinu, 2015). 6 The VICO database includes 759 VC-backed companies that received their 
first round of VC investment between 1994 and 2004 and were less than 10 years old at that 
time. The companies cover all of the early stages of VC investments: seed, start-up, and 
expansion. The companies are randomly drawn both from commercial databases that are 
widely used in scholarly work (Thomson One, VCPro-Database and Zephyr) and from 
country-specific proprietary datasets (the yearbooks of the Belgium Venture Capital and 
Finnish Venture Capital Associations, the ZEW Foundation Panel for Germany, the RITA 
directory and Private Equity Monitor for Italy, the Web Capital Riesgo Database for Spain, 
and Venture Source in the United Kingdom). The data on VC investments were cross-checked 
with information available on ventures’ and investors’ websites, press releases and other 
public information sources.  
A central data-collection unit assured the consistency and reliability of the collected 
data. This quality assurance effort and the use of a plurality of information sources overcome 
the limitations of commercial databases. As is well known, commercial databases provide 
inadequate coverage of VC investments outside of the US. In particular, they tend to over-
represent the role of IVC investors and give only partial coverage of, and often 
mischaracterize, captive investors (e.g., Ivanov and Xie, 2010; Da Gbadija, et al., 2014). For 
example, if we consider the investments in young high-tech companies conducted in Europe 
between 1994 and 2004, the share represented by IVC investors is 72% according to 
                                                 
6 A full description of the database is provided by Bertoni and Martí Pellón (2011). 
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Thomson One but only 55% according to VICO. GVC is the category of VC investor that is 
most underrepresented by commercial databases. If we consider again the investments in 
young high-tech companies conducted in Europe between 1994 and 2004, the share of GVC 
is 2% according to Thomson One and 19% according to VICO.  
VC investors are identified and classified according to the ownership and governance 
of the management company. An investor characterized by an independent management 
company is classified as an IVC investor. Captive investors are classified depending on the 
identity of the entity that controls their management processes. Investors whose parent 
companies are non-financial companies are classified as CVC investors, and those whose 
parent companies are financial intermediaries as BVC investors. If the parent is a 
governmental agency or institution, the investor is classified as a GVC investor.7  
Our initial population consists of all first investments by IVC, CVC, BVC and GVC 
investors in companies included in the VICO dataset. Investments for which we do not know 
the VC investor type are excluded from the analysis. In particular, we consider the first round 
in which a given VC investor invested in a given company for the first time. We exclude from 
the analysis all follow-on rounds in which a given investor participates (see Dimov and 
Gedajlovic, 2010, for a similar approach). The rationale behind this approach is that an 
investor reveals the structure of his/her investment preferences when he or she first invests in 
a company. The inclusion of follow-on rounds in the computation of specialization indices 
would instead result in the overrepresentation of cases in which VC investment is split over 
several rounds. The number of investment rounds is the outcome of a complex contracting 
process engaged in by the investor and the investee company (Gompers, 1995). The staging of 
VC investments can vary systematically across industries, countries and phases of the 
                                                 
7 There is generally a close correspondence between the type of VC investor and the origin of the funds it 
invests. Captive investors generally invest funds obtained from their parent company (CVC or BVC) or public 
sources (GVC). See Mayer et al. (2005). 
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economic cycle. Including all investment rounds, rather than just the first investment, would 
thus give us no additional information about the structure of investors’ preferences and would 
expose us to measurement biases. 
After eliminating the cases that do not meet the criteria discussed above, we are left 
with a sample of 1,663 first VC investments made by 846 VC investors into 737 companies. 
The VICO database provides detailed information about investee company characteristics that 
are used here to study the investment patterns of different types of VC investors in Europe.  
Insert Table 1 here 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the 1,663 VC investments included in the VICO 
database according to the VC investor type and the country of the investee firm. The majority 
of the VC investments are made by IVC firms (55.2%). The second most represented VC 
investor type is GVC (19.5%), followed by BVC (15.4%). The relatively high number of 
BVC and GVC investments is an interesting peculiarity of the European VC market (see 
Section 6 for a comparison with the US). CVC investors cover the remaining 9.9% of 
investments. With respect to the country of the investee company, the most represented 
countries are the United Kingdom (24.8%), France (23.6%) and Germany (17.7%).  
Table 1 also shows the distribution of investments across the categories defined for 
each of the six dimensions considered. The distribution of investments across industries 
highlights the interest of European VC in the software (34.2%) and biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals (24.4%) industries. Companies operating in Internet and telecommunication 
(TLC) services (20.6%) and ICT manufacturing8 (17.1%) are also important targets of VC 
investments. Investee companies are typically very young at the time of the investment: only 
15.7% of the investments are in companies older than 5 years, whereas 22.7% of the 
investments are in newly funded companies (less than 1 year old). Investee companies are 
                                                 
8 ICT manufacturing includes the following industries: electronic components, computers, telecommunications 
equipment, and electronic, medical and optical instruments. 
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also rather small: 38.7% of the investments are in micro companies with fewer than 10 
employees, 48.6% are in small companies (i.e., between 10 and 49 employees), and only 
12.8% are in companies with 50 or more employees. A total of 24.2% of the VC investments 
occur during the seed stage, 37.0% during the start-up stage and 38.8% during the expansion 
stage. Another variable that has attracted the interest of VC scholars is the geographic 
distance between the investee company and the VC investor (e.g., Sorensen and Stuart, 2001). 
In 29.0% of investments, the VC investor is located less than 10 km away from the investee 
company, and in 19.6% of investments, the distance is between 10 and 50 km. The distance is 
more than 300 km for only 22.6% of investments. Lastly, the vast majority (77.5%) of the 
investments in our sample are domestic. These data confirm the local bias of VC investors 
and their limited internationalization, which is also highlighted by previous studies.9 
5. Results 
5.1. The Investment Patterns of Different VC Investor Types in Europe 
The results of the analysis are illustrated in Table 2. In addition to the value of the TBIs, the 
table shows their standard deviations (Schubert and Grupp, 2011) and the result of a t-test of 
the null hypothesis that the corresponding TBI is equal to 0. Overall, the results show that 
each VC investor type has a defined pattern of investment with respect to the dimensions 
considered.  
Compared to other VC investor types, IVC investors are more inclined to invest in 
Internet and TLC services and less inclined to invest in R&D and engineering services. IVC 
investors shy away from the riskiest investments in the youngest companies at their seed stage 
and are specialized in more mature companies. The TBI of IVC in companies three to five 
years old is 0.046, implying that IVC’s tendency to invest in this age category is 9.7% greater 
                                                 
9 For instance, Schertler and Tykvová (2010) found that approximately two thirds of global VC deals between 
2000 and 2008 included only domestic investors. 
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than that of the entire sample.10 Similarly, IVC’s TBI in the expansion stage is 0.037, which 
corresponds to a tendency to invest in this category of development stage that is greater by 
7.6% than that of the entire sample. The TBIs of IVC investors increase monotonically with 
the size of the investee company and are negative and significant for companies with fewer 
than ten employees. IVC investors do not exhibit any inclination to select local companies: 
their TBIs are negative and significant for the first two categories of distance and positive and 
significant for the remaining two categories, indicating a relative specialization in investments 
in more distant companies. The effect is economically meaningful: their TBI in the 0-10 km 
category is -0.053, which corresponds to a tendency to invest in companies included in this 
distance category that is smaller by 10.0% than that of the entire sample. IVC investors are 
13.5% more inclined than the overall sample to invest in companies included in the 50-300 
km category (TBI=0.040). 
CVC investors are 35.2% more prone than the entire sample to invest in Internet and 
TLC services (TBI=0.150), while they are 30.4% less likely to invest in biotech and 
pharmaceuticals (TBI=-0.179). CVC investors do not exhibit any specific investment pattern 
with regard to the age, stage and size of investee companies. However, they exhibit the most 
marked preference for distant companies: their TBI is positive and significant for companies 
located farther than 300 km from their premises. Similarly, CVC investors are 77.4% more 
inclined than the entire sample to invest in cross-border investments (TBI=0.279). 
BVC investors do not exhibit a distinct pattern of industry specialization. However, 
they show the strongest preference for non-risky investments: they have a clear aversion to 
newly created companies (TBI=-0.197, indicating that they are 32.9% less present than the 
entire sample in this category) and for companies with fewer than ten employees (TBI=-
                                                 
10 Using Equation (2), we obtain that a TBI of 0.046 corresponds to a BI of 1.097, which implies that IVC’s 
share of VC investments in companies aged 3-5 years is 9.7% greater than the overall share of IVC investments 
out of the total number of VC investments. 
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0.151, indicating that they are 26.3% less inclined than the entire sample to invest in 
companies included in this category), whereas they specialize in companies older than five 
years and with fifty or more employees. BVC investors also have a preference for local 
investments. In particular, they are attracted to companies that are located between 10 and 50 
km from their premises, and they abstain from investing in companies in the 50-300 km 
category (TBI=-0.209, indicating that they are, on average, 44.2% less likely than the entire 
sample to invest in companies that belong to this category). 
The investment pattern of GVC investors diverges the most from that of all other 
investor types. In terms of industry specialization, GVC investors neglect Internet and TLC 
services and focus instead on R&D and engineering services, biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals and other high-tech manufacturing. GVC investors specialize in the youngest 
companies in the seed stage, while they ignore more mature companies and companies in the 
expansion stage. With a TBI of 0.185, GVC investors are 45.3% more inclined than the entire 
sample to invest in companies younger than 1 year. Similarly, the TBIs of GVC investors 
decrease monotonically with investee company size: they are positive and significant for the 
smallest companies (fewer than ten employees) and negative and significant for the largest 
companies (more than twenty-five employees). They also are the investors most strongly 
oriented toward local investments. Their TBI is positive and significant for investments in 
companies located closer than 10 km from their premises and is negative and significant for 
investments farther than 300 km away. Similarly, GVC investors are the investors most 
specialized in national companies. With TBI=0.077, they are 73% more oriented to invest 
domestically than the entire sample. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Next, we measure the extent to which VC investor types differ from one another by 
computing the correlation between their TBIs. Each VC investor type i is characterized by a 
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vector 𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑗,𝑘
𝑖  of the 23 TBIs for all of the categories of all the dimensions under consideration 
(i.e., ∑ 𝑀𝑗
6
𝑗=1 =23, see footnote 2). We examine the similarity of these vectors by computing 
their correlations. Because the number of elements in 𝑇𝐵𝐼𝑗,𝑘
𝑖  is small, we use Spearman’s rank 
correlation.11 The results are reported in Table 3. 
The correlations between the investment patterns of private investors are not 
significant, which suggests that their investment patterns are independent. By contrast, the 
investment pattern of GVC investors correlates negatively with those of the IVC and BVC 
investor types, with their Spearman’s rank correlation being significant at 1%. This result 
suggests that the investment pattern of GVC investors is the reverse of that of IVC and BVC 
investors, which means that GVC investors specialize in the niches of the market in which 
IVC and BVC are least likely present. 
Insert Table 3 here 
5.2. Stability of Investment Patterns over Time and across Countries 
In this section, we examine the stability of the investment patterns over time and across the 
different countries in our sample. The burst of the Internet bubble in the late 1990s is thought 
to have been followed by a substantial refocus of the investment strategies of VC investors 
(e.g., Green, 2004). To check whether such a structural break occurred in the investment 
pattern of the different VC investor types, we computed two vectors of TBIs by splitting the 
sample into two periods: before the burst of the Internet bubble (1994-2001) and after (2002-
2004). We then computed the Spearman’s correlation indices for the value of the TBIs 
relating to each investor type between the two periods. If a structural break occurred, the TBIs 
in the two periods would derive from independent investment processes and we would expect 
no statistically significant correlation between the corresponding TBIs. Accordingly, we can 
                                                 
11 As a robustness check of the following analysis, we used Kendall’s tau rank correlation instead of Spearman’s 
rank correlation. The results are robust and available from the authors upon request. 
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reject the null hypothesis that a structural break occurred if we can reject the null hypothesis 
that the correlation between the TBIs in the two periods is zero. The results are reported in 
Table 4.  
The overall correlation, computed from 92 observations, is positive and significant at 
the 1% confidence level, indicating that the investment patterns of the VC investor types are 
persistent. When distinguishing between different types of VC investor, the TBIs of IVC, 
BVC and GVC investors exhibit positive and significant correlations between the two periods 
(the correlation is significant at 1% for IVC and GVC investors, and at 10% for BVC 
investors). However, the correlation for CVC investors is not statistically significant, which 
indicates that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that with the burst of the Internet bubble a 
structural break occurred in the investment pattern of CVC investors.  
Insert Table 4 here 
Next, we focus on inter-country differences in the investment patterns of VC investor 
types. To check the inter-country similarity of investment patterns, for each country we 
calculate the vector of TBIs based only on the observations related to that country and 
compare it, using Spearman’s correlation, to the vector obtained for the observations related 
to the other countries in our sample. If the investment processes were independent across 
countries, we would expect no statistically significant correlation between the corresponding 
TBIs. Accordingly, we can reject the null hypothesis that the investment processes are 
independent across countries if we can reject the null hypothesis that the correlation between 
their TBIs is zero. The results are presented in Table 5.12  
Overall, the TBIs in each country are similar to the TBIs in the other countries under 
consideration, with a correlation of 0.32, which is significant at 1%. This result suggests that 
                                                 
12 To avoid small numbers, we reclassified the industry dimension from 6 to 5 categories, which brings the total 
number of categories from 23 to 22.  
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the investment patterns of different VC investor types are not independent across Europe, and 
that different investor types, on average, behave similarly in different European countries. 
When we separately consider the TBIs of each country, all correlations are positive and 
significant at conventional confidence levels, which means that for each country we can reject 
the null hypothesis that the investment patterns of VC investors in that country are 
independent from those in the rest of the sample. Finally, when we separately consider the 
TBIs related to each VC investor type, we notice that investment patterns are significantly 
correlated across countries for each VC investor type (significance is 1% for IVC, BVC and 
GVC and 10% for CVC).  
Insert Table 5 here 
5.3. A Comparison of the Investment Patterns of Different VC Investor Types 
between Europe and the US 
The aim of this section is to compare the investment patterns that we find in our study with 
evidence about VC investments in the US. For this purpose, we resort to the Thomson One 
database (previously VentureXpert, retrieved on December 23, 2011), which has been 
extensively used in the VC literature. According to this database, between 1994 and 2004, 
3,457 VC investors belonging to the four types of VC investor considered in this paper were 
responsible for 24,242 first VC investments in 9,024 companies less than 10 years old, 
operating in high-tech sectors, and located in the US. The distribution of these investments 
according to the VC investor type, industry and age of investee company at the time of 
investment are reported in Table 6. 13  Of these investments, 68.0% were made by IVC 
investors, 17.4% by CVC investors, 12.2% by BVC investors and the remaining 2.5% by 
GVC investors. A χ2 test indicates that this distribution is significantly different from the 
corresponding distribution in Europe (p-value<1%). In particular, IVC and CVC investments 
                                                 
13 We do not consider here the investee company’s stage of development at the time of the VC investment 
because the classification is not entirely comparable across the Thomson One and VICO datasets. 
18 
are less frequent in Europe than in the US, whereas BVC and, more remarkably, GVC 
investments are more frequent in Europe. There are also significant differences between the 
US and Europe relating to the distribution of VC investments by industry and age of the 
investee companies. 
Insert Table 6 here  
Similar to the previous sections, we compute the TBI for each VC investor type in the 
US for the two dimensions for which a meaningful comparison was possible, and we test their 
significance. Table 7 presents the TBIs for the VC investor types in the US. We then compute 
the Spearman’s correlation indices of the TBIs in the US and Europe for the four VC investor 
types under consideration in this study. The investment patterns in the US and Europe for the 
four investor types differ substantially. The overall correlation indices computed on 40 
observations14 is equal to 0.09 and is not significant at customary confidence levels. We also 
compute the correlation indices for each TBI dimension. We find that the investment patterns 
in the US and Europe are not correlated along either the industry (0.17, non significant) or age 
(-0.17, non significant) dimensions. When we separately consider the TBIs related to each VC 
investor type, the only significant correlation is that between GVC investors in Europe and 
the US (the Spearman’s correlation index is equal to 0.61, significant at 10%). The TBIs of all 
other investor types in the two geographical areas do not significantly correlate.  
Insert Table 7 here  
Table 7 shows that the only industries in which the investment patterns of VC investor 
types are similar are the biotechnology and pharmaceutical and the Internet and TLC service 
industries. As for age, the most striking difference is the inverted role of IVC and GVC 
investors in the two institutional contexts. In the US, IVC investors specialize in very young 
companies and abstain from investing in 3- to 5-year-old companies, whereas by contrast, 
                                                 
14 There are 6 categories for the industry dimension, 4 categories for the age dimension and 4 VC investor types. 
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GVC investors specialize in these companies. This evidence confirms that IVC in Europe is 
less attracted to risky investments than in the US (see, e.g., Bruton et al., 2005).  
6. Discussion 
The results illustrated in the previous sections highlight significant differences across the 
investment patterns of different types of VC investors in Europe. They also highlight 
significant differences in the investment patterns of the VC investor types between Europe 
and the US.  
In Europe, IVC investors abstain from making risky investments and tend to select 
mature and large companies in the expansion stage. This investment pattern differs markedly 
from that exhibited by IVC investors in the US, in which IVC appears to be relatively more 
inclined to risk taking. Another interesting difference between Europe and the US is that the 
popular Silicon Valley “20-minute rule”, according to which start-up companies located 
farther than a 20-minute drive from the VC firm will not be funded by IVC investors,15 is not 
confirmed by our data on the investments made by IVC investors in Europe (see Fritsch and 
Schilder, 2008, for similar evidence based on German data).  
Previous studies (e.g., Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005) found that CVC investors in the 
US are particularly attracted to companies operating in industries with high technological 
ferment and weak intellectual property protection. This evidence, based on US data, is 
confirmed by our findings on European investments. In Europe, CVC investors were indeed 
found to specialize in Internet and telecommunication services, an industry with a weak 
appropriability regime (Malerba, 2004) and high technological turbulence in the observation 
period (Montobbio, 2004), and to abstain from investing in biotechnology and 
pharmaceuticals, where intellectual property can be effectively protected (Levin et al., 1987). 
                                                 
15 “It’s not the people you know. It’s where you are.” The New York Times, 10/22/2006. 
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Our results are also consistent with previous empirical literature based in the US (Gupta and 
Sapienza, 1992) and in other countries (Mayer et al., 2005) indicating that CVC investors 
adopt a more global investment strategy than the other investor types and are more inclined to 
select companies located far away from their premises. Conversely, our results relating to 
Europe do not support the US-based evidence that CVC investors are less likely to invest in 
early stage companies than IVC investors (see, e.g., Cumming, 2006, on Canada; Katila et al., 
2008, and Ferrary, 2010, on the US). This result is most likely a consequence of the 
abovementioned risk aversion of European IVC investors. 
We found that BVC investors in Europe, when compared with other types of private 
VC investors, are more likely to invest locally, where they can exploit their superior ability to 
gather soft information (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Fritsch and Schilder, 2008). Moreover, 
our results clearly document that BVC investors are more inclined to invest in older and 
larger companies. This result conforms to the view that the primary objective of BVC 
investors is to support the establishment of profitable bank relationships with investee 
companies (Mayer et al., 2005, and Hellmann et al., 2008, find similar results in a sample of 
international and US firms, respectively).  
Finally, in Europe, GVC investors exhibit an investment pattern that differs 
remarkably from that of all other types of VC investors. Previous studies argued that the 
rationale for GVC is to fill the funding gap left by private investors (Lerner, 1999; Lerner, 
2002). Consistent with this argument, we find that GVC investors in Europe specialize in 
investments that do not attract other types of investor. Because of the information 
asymmetries surrounding young, small high-tech companies and their high risk of failure, 
these companies find it difficult to attract private funding, particularly at the seed stage (e.g., 
Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). These difficulties are amplified in industries such as 
biotechnology, in which time to market is long and substantial resources are required for new 
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product development. Our analysis shows that these industries are precisely those in which 
European GVC investors specialize. Moreover, consistent with previous studies based both in 
Europe and the US (e.g., Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Mayer et al., 2005; Fritsch and Schilder, 
2008), we find that GVC investors more frequently select local investment targets, which is 
consistent with the fact that GVC programs have often been created to implement regional 
development objectives (Leleux and Surlemont, 2003).  
7. Conclusions 
In this study, we analyzed the investment patterns of four types of VC investor (IVC, CVC, 
BVC and GVC) in Europe between 1994 and 2004, and we compared these patterns with 
those of the corresponding VC investor types in the US. We have shown that, in Europe, VC 
investor types exhibit different investment patterns in terms of industry, age, size, stage of 
development, and localization of their investee companies. In addition, these investment 
patterns are quite stable over time (with the exception of those of CVC investors, which 
changed significantly after the burst of the Internet bubble) and similar across different 
European countries. However the investment patterns differ markedly between Europe and 
the US. Most notably, the role played by IVC in the US, where this investor type invests in 
the youngest and riskiest companies, is different from the role it plays in Europe, where it 
tends to invest later, leaving the riskiest investments to GVC. 
This study offers two original contributions to the VC literature. First, the VC 
literature has recognized that the ownership and governance of VC firms is an important 
source of heterogeneity in VC markets (Dimov and Gelajdovic, 2010). In this paper, we have 
provided a comprehensive overview of the investment patterns of IVC, CVC, BVC and GVC 
investors using relative specialization indices. These indices are particularly appropriate for 
this type of analysis because they allow the investment patterns of different types of VC 
investors to be systematically and parsimoniously compared and the statistical significance of 
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any differences between these patterns to be tested. As far as we know, this study represents 
the first time that such tools have been used in the entrepreneurial finance domain. 
Second, this study offers an original contribution to the debate about GVC. Over the 
past two decades, several GVC firms (and other government-supported VC firms) have been 
created in Europe and several other countries with the aim of developing active VC markets 
(Brander et al., 2014). The available evidence suggests that the impact of GVC investments 
on the economic performance of investee companies has been dismal (e.g., Grilli and 
Murtinu, 2014; Cumming et al., 2014. See Cumming, 2007 for an exception). 16  While 
providing a systematic illustration of the patterns of investment of GVC investors in Europe 
during a period in which European governments were active in fostering VC investor activity, 
our study offers a new perspective on these results. GVC investors have specialized in 
investing in industries (biotechnology and pharmaceuticals) and types of companies (young, 
small, seed-stage companies) that have proven unattractive to private VC in Europe. This 
evidence indicates that in Europe, GVC has filled the entrepreneurial financing gap left by 
private VC investors. Therefore, the above-mentioned limited “treatment effect” of GVC 
investments should come as no surprise. However, our results also suggest that GVC 
investors have not been able to attract private VC to the young, small, early stage companies 
that were the target of their investment activity because the different investment patterns of 
IVC and GVC investors have proven to be stable over time.  
                                                 
16 One possible reason for this result is that GVC investors provide limited value-enhancing services to investee 
companies (Luukkonen et al., 2013). In accordance with this view, the effects appear to be more positive when 
GVC investors syndicate with private VC investors. For instance, while analyzing a large sample of VC-backed 
companies in 25 countries, Brander et al. (2014) documented that these syndicated investments have 
outperformed other types of VC investments in terms of the total amount of investment obtained by companies 
and the likelihood of successful exit (i.e., through IPOs and third-party acquisitions). Bertoni and Tykvová 
(2015) found similar results with regard to the patenting activity of young European biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies. In Europe, however, GVC investors are unlikely to form syndicates, due to the 
divergence of their objectives and investment specialization patterns from those of private investors. For an 
overview of worldwide evidence on GVC investments, see Colombo et al. (2014b).  
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We believe that our study extends the knowledge of the VC market in Europe. 
Nonetheless, we are aware of its limitations, which open interesting avenues for future 
research. First, our results highlight that there are important differences in the investment 
patterns of several types of VC investors between Europe and the US and that these 
differences are far more pronounced than those between individual European countries. The 
analysis of the sources of these differences goes beyond the scope of the paper. On the basis 
of previous work, one might argue that these differences are possibly the result of differences 
relating to the institutional environment in which investors operate (Bruton et al., 2005; Da 
Gbadji et al., 2014). The analysis of this issue is clearly an interesting direction for future 
research. We think that relative specialization indices represent a valid methodology for 
performing this type of analysis.  
Second, our results indicate that the ownership and governance of VC investors deeply 
influence their patterns of investment. However, investors differ not only due to ultimate 
ownership but also due to their experience, reputation, and skills. An interesting further step 
would consist of an analysis of the heterogeneity of the investments within each VC investor 
type. Previous studies have shown that the reputation and size of an IVC investor indeed 
influences its investment strategy (Murray, 1999; Dimov et al., 2007). It would be interesting 
to extend this analysis to CVC, BVC and GVC investors.  
Third, while investment patterns are positively correlated (i.e., not independent) across 
European countries, this correlation is not perfect. This raises the question about which 
European country’s configuration of investment patterns is most effective in channeling funds 
(and the non-financial support that comes with it) to entrepreneurial startups. Relatedly, our 
results highlight a very different role played by IVC and GVC in Europe and the US. While in 
Europe GVC is more likely than IVC to invest in companies at their earliest stages, the 
opposite happens in the US. Because IVC and GVC differ markedly in their screening, 
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monitoring and coaching skills, this inversion in their role may have relevant consequences on 
the average quality of startups that receive VC financing and on their ability to survive and 
prosper. The comparative analysis of how investment patterns affect the effectiveness of the 
VC market is beyond the scope of this paper, but represents a very interesting topic for future 
research. 
In spite of these limitations, this study has important implications for European 
policymakers, and certain guidelines for improving policy intervention are indicated. 
European policymakers have been trying since well before the Lisbon Agenda (e.g., European 
Commission, 1998) to create an EU-wide VC market for early stage high-potential 
companies. Our results are consistent with the view that despite these efforts, the European 
VC market remains fragmented. First, IVC investors in Europe do not exhibit any pronounced 
propensity for cross-border investments nor has the existing propensity increased over time. 
Second, CVC investors, which indeed specialize in cross-border VC investments, account for 
a smaller share of investments in Europe than in the US. Recently, specific measures have 
been taken by European policymakers aimed at regulatory simplification and harmonization. 
In particular, in a series of recent acts (most notably the Small Business Act and the Single 
Market Act), the European Commission has committed itself to promoting cross-border VC 
investment by adopting new rules ensuring that VC funds established in any member state can 
be invested freely throughout the EU (the so-called pan-European passport for VC investors). 
Our results suggest that measures such as these are a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, 
more is needed to overcome the fragmentation of the European VC market. As discussed 
above, GVC plays a fundamental role in the European VC market. A weakness of 
governmental intervention in the form of GVC that has not been mentioned in previous 
studies is the highly localized nature of these GVC investments. GVC investors are the most 
prone to invest in companies located closer than 10 km and the least prone to invest abroad, 
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which is likely a consequence of the local nature of their mandates.17 The local bias of GVC 
investors creates two types of problems. First, it exposes GVC investors to the risk of 
regulatory capture (Lerner, 2002), thereby jeopardizing their investment selection capability. 
Second, it exacerbates the fragmentation of the European VC market. We believe that the 
removal of the regulatory constraints that led to this local bias would help to make the 
European VC market less fragmented and more efficient.  
                                                 
17 Investment vehicles founded by a regional or national government are often statutorily prevented or otherwise 
discouraged from investing outside of regional or national borders. The obvious reason for this prohibition is that 
policymakers would find it difficult to explain to taxpayers in one region or country why their money is being 
used to support companies in another region or country. SITRA, a Finnish GVC investor, is an interesting 
exception. SITRA invests a portion of VC funds outside of Finland, claiming that the objective of these cross-
border investments is to create a window to the international VC market and learn about new investment 
practices. At the end of 2010, the international portion of the assets managed by SITRA had a book value of 42 
million Euros, corresponding to 6% of total assets (SITRA, 2011). 
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Tables 
Table 1: Distribution of the VC Investments 
  N %     N % 
Investor type    Country of the investee company   
Independent VC (IVC) 918 55.2%  Belgium 211 12.7% 
Corporate VC (CVC) 165 9.9%  Finland 114 6.9% 
Bank-affiliated VC (BVC) 256 15.4%  France 392 23.6% 
Government VC (GVC) 324 19.5%  Germany 294 17.7% 
     Italy 131 7.9% 
    Spain 108 6.5% 
    United Kingdom 413 24.8% 
Total 1,663 100.0%  Total 1,663 100.0% 
Industry of the investee company 
Age of the of the investee company at the time of the 
investment 
ICT manufacturinga 284 17.1%  <1 year  378 22.7% 
Biotech and pharmaceutics 405 24.4%  1-2 years 560 33.7% 
Other high-tech manufacturingb 34 2.0%  3-5 years 464 27.9% 
Software 568 34.2%  >5 years 261 15.7% 
Internet and TLC services 343 20.6%     
R&D and engineering services 29 1.7%     
Total 1,663 100.0%   Total 1,663 100.0% 
Size of the of the investee company at the time of the 
investment  
Development stage of the of the investee company at 
the time of the investment 
<10 employees 430 38.7%  Seed 312 24.2% 
10-24 employees 339 30.5%  Start up 476 37.0% 
25-49 employees 201 18.1%  Expansion 499 38.8% 
>49 employees 142 12.8%     
Total 1,112 100.0%   Total 1,287 100.0% 
Distance between VC investor and investee 
company 
 Localization of the investee company 
<10 km 407 29.0%  Same country as the investor 1,288 77.5% 
10-50 km 275 19.6%  Different country from the investor 375 22.5% 
50-300 km 318 22.6%     
>300 km 404 28.8%     
Total 1,404 100.0%   Total 1,663 100.0% 
       
a This category includes electronic components, computers, telecommunication equipment, electronic, medical and optical 
instruments. b This category includes robotics and automation equipment, aerospace.  
  
32 
Table 2: TBIs of Different Types of VC Investor in Europe 
  IVC CVC BVC GVC 
Industry of the investee company         
ICT manufacturinga 0.019    -0.123    -0.020    0.015    
 (0.023)  (0.094)  (0.065)  (0.054)  
Biotech and pharmaceutics -0.013    -0.179 ** 0.013    0.093 ** 
 (0.020)  (0.080)  (0.050)  (0.038)  
Other high-tech manufacturingb -0.182 * 0.280 * -0.447    0.325 *** 
 (0.104)  (0.168)  (0.273)  (0.096)  
Software -0.014    0.023    -0.003    0.028    
 (0.016)  (0.049)  (0.040)  (0.033)  
Internet and TLC services 0.052 *** 0.150 *** 0.029    -0.366 *** 
 (0.019)  (0.057)  (0.054)  (0.070)  
R&D and engineering services -0.280 ** 0.163    0.057    0.321 *** 
 (0.127)  (0.223)  (0.201)  (0.105)   
Age of the investee company at the time of the investment  
< 1 year -0.042 * 0.032    -0.197 *** 0.185 *** 
 (0.022)  (0.065)  (0.067)  (0.033)  
1-2 years 0.001    0.030    -0.007    -0.014    
 (0.015)  (0.049)  (0.041)  (0.036)  
3-5 years 0.046 *** -0.046    0.050    -0.186 *** 
 (0.016)  (0.063)  (0.043)  (0.051)  
> 5 years -0.033    -0.038    0.138 ** -0.019    
  (0.027)  (0.090)  (0.054)  (0.059)   
Size of the investee company at the time of the investment  
< 10 employees -0.042 ** 0.024     -0.151 *** 0.189 *** 
 (0.019)  (0.054)  (0.051)  (0.027)  
10-24 employees 0.002     0.058     0.026     -0.068     
 (0.021)  (0.062)  (0.047)  (0.053)  
25-49 employees 0.046 * -0.178     0.068     -0.152 * 
 (0.026)  (0.116)  (0.063)  (0.081)  
> 49 employees 0.048     -0.006     0.187 *** -0.575 *** 
  (0.032)   (0.118)   (0.063)   (0.121)   
Development stage of the investee company at the time of the investment     
Seed -0.051 ** -0.062    -0.080    0.180 *** 
 (0.024)  (0.086)  (0.067)  (0.036)  
Start up -0.008    -0.005    -0.015    0.034    
 (0.016)  (0.059)  (0.046)  (0.034)  
Expansion 0.037 *** 0.040    0.057    -0.207 *** 
  (0.014)   (0.053)   (0.039)   (0.047)   
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Table 2: (cont.) 
  IVC CVC BVC GVC 
Distance between investor and investee company 
< 10 km -0.053 *** -0.143 * -0.013     0.165 *** 
 (0.020)  (0.084)  (0.050)  (0.030)  
10-50 km -0.069 ** -0.035     0.181 *** 0.024     
 (0.027)  (0.095)  (0.047)  (0.051)  
50-300 km 0.063 *** -0.107     -0.209 *** -0.016     
 (0.019)  (0.094)  (0.074)  (0.050)  
> 300 km 0.040 ** 0.184 *** -0.001     -0.255 *** 
  (0.017)   (0.051)   (0.049)   (0.056)   
Localization of the investee company         
Same country of the investor -0.009    -0.127 *** -0.001    0.077 *** 
 (0.006)  (0.029)  (0.016)  (0.009)  
Different country from the investor 0.030    0.279 *** 0.002    -0.404 *** 
  (0.019)   (0.041)   (0.053)   (0.068)   
 
Legend. For each investment dimension, the table shows the TBI of each investor in each investment category. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses.  It also shows the significance of t-tests of the null hypothesis that the TBI be equal to 0. 
*p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. a Electronic components, computers, telecommunication equipment, electronic, medical and 
optical instruments. b Robotics and automation equipment, aerospace.  
  
34 
Table 3: Spearman’s Correlation of the TBIs of Different Types of VC Investor in 
Europe 
  IVC CVC BVC GVC 
IVC 1        
CVC -0.065  1      
BVC 0.237  -0.060  1    
GVC -0.843 *** -0.115   -0.564 *** 1   
Legend. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Number of observations: 23.  
 
Table 4. Spearman’s Correlation of the TBIs of Different Types of VC Investor in 
Europe Before and After the Internet Bubble 
VC investor type  Number of observations Spearman 
All 92 0.53 *** 
IVC 23 0.65 *** 
CVC 23 0.24  
BVC 23 0.38 * 
GVC  23 0.81 *** 
Legend. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%.  
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Table 5. Spearman’s Correlation of the TBIs of Different Types of VC Investor in each 
country and in the rest of the sample 
  Number of observations Spearman 
All 604 0.32 *** 
By country    
Belgium vs. rest of sample 88 0.51 *** 
Finland vs. rest of sample 88 0.32 *** 
France vs. rest of sample 88 0.37 *** 
Germany vs. rest of sample 88 0.23 ** 
Italy vs. rest of sample 76 0.25 ** 
Spain vs. rest of sample 88 0.23 ** 
United Kingdom vs. rest of sample 88 0.32 *** 
By VC investor type    
IVC 151 0.21 *** 
CVC 151 0.14 * 
BVC 151 0.23 *** 
GVC 151 0.59 *** 
Legend. *p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. In this table the industry dimension has been reclassified in 5 categories instead of 6. 
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Table 6: Distribution of the VC Investments by Types of VC Investor and 
Characteristics of Investee Companies in the US (1994-2004) 
  N %     N % 
VC investor type    
 
  
Independent VC (IVC) 16,478 68.0%  
 
  
Corporate VC (CVC) 4,207 17.4%  
 
  
Bank affiliated VC (BVC) 2,955 12.2%  
 
  
Government VC (GVC) 602 2.5%  
 
  
Total 24,242 100.0%         
Industry of the investee company   Age of the investee company at the time of the investment 
ICT manufacturing 3,751 15.5%  <1 year 5,646 23.5% 
Biotech and pharmaceutics 2,283 9.4%  1-2 years 9,601 40.0% 
Other high-tech manufacturing 311 1.3%  3-5 years 6,447 26.9% 
Software 9,243 38.1%  >5 years 2,282 9.5% 
Internet and TLC services 7,428 30.6%     
R&D and engineering services 1,226 5.1%     
Total 24,242 100.0%   Total 23,976 100.0% 
Source: Thomson One.  
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Table 7: TBIs of Different Types of VC Investors in the US  
  IVC CVC BVC GVC 
Industry of the investee company       
ICT manufacturing -0.002  0.041 *** -0.041 * -0.034  
 (0.005)  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.049)  
Biotech and pharmaceutics -0.015 ** -0.063 *** 0.082 *** 0.276 *** 
 (0.007)  (0.023)  (0.024)  (0.041)  
Other high-tech manufacturing -0.011  -0.125 * 0.138 ** 0.217  
 (0.020)  (0.070)  (0.063)  (0.134)  
Software 0.006 ** -0.009  -0.011  -0.047 * 
 (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.028)  
Internet and TLC services -0.002  0.019 * -0.001  -0.077 ** 
 (0.003)  (0.010)  (0.013)  (0.034)  
R&D and engineering services 0.008  -0.046  0.002  0.084  
  (0.009)   (0.032)   (0.037)   (0.079)   
Age of the investee company at the time of the investment 
<1 year 0.052 *** -0.143 *** -0.141 *** -0.016  
 (0.003)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.039)  
1-2 years -0.014 *** 0.036 *** 0.031 *** -0.043  
 (0.003)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.028)  
3-5 years -0.027 *** 0.054 *** 0.043 *** 0.085 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.031)  
>5 years -0.004  -0.009  0.042 * -0.054  
  (0.007)   (0.022)   (0.025)   (0.070)   
 
Legend. For each investment dimension, the table shows the TBI of each investor in each investment category. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses.  It also shows the significance of t-tests of the null hypothesis that the TBI be equal to 0. 
*p<10%; **p<5%; ***p<1%. Details on the industry reclassification are available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
 
